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AMERICA'S SHIFTING FASCINATION WITH
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
EDWARD B. ROCK'

In the last few years, comparative corporate governance-German and
Japanese corporate governance in particular-has been a hot topic in U.S.
law reviews and conferences. 1 Some of the best contemporary corporate

* Professor of Law, University of Pennsyl vania Law School. This is a revi sed version of a
lecture I gave to German bankers, corporate lawyers and academics at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitiit, Frankfurt am Main, Germany in June 1994.
I am grateful to participants in workshops at the Faculty of Law, Johann Wolfgang Goelhe Universitiit, Frankfurt am Main, and the Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, for helpful
comments and criticisms. Special thanks to Mark Roe and Richard Buxbaum for helping me
(incompletely, I fear) to avoid mi scharacterizing their views. All remaining errors are, of course, my
own. The interested reader should read the marvelous articles by Professors Roe and Buxbaum and
others and form their own judgments. This work was supported by the Univers ity of Pennsy lvania's
Institute for Law and Economics and the Institut ftir Arbeils-, Wirtsc hafts- und Zivil Recht, Faculty of
Law, Johann Wolfgang Goelhe - Universitiit, Frankfurt am Mair1.
I. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Brittanfa ?: Institutional Investor
Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1997 ( 1994); Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional
Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. I ( 1991 ); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as C01porate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L.
REv. 1277 (1991) (discuss ing Germany, Japan, Sweden, Canada and the UK); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Investm ent Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the
Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1993) (ex am ining whelher a Swedish form of
investment company could be useful in American corporate governance); Rona ld J. Gilson & Rein ier
Kraakrnan, Reinventing th e Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863, 876 ( 1991) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director]; Ronald J. Gilson
& Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Co1porate Governance and
Industrial Organization, I 02 YAL E L.J. 871 ( 1993); Martin Liplon & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187,
218-22 (1991) (drawing parallels to the German and Japanese systems); J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers
in Japan : Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35 UCLA L. REv. I (19 87); Mark J. Roe,
A Political Th eory of American Corporate Finance, 9 1 COLUM. L. REV. I 0, 59-62 ( 1991) (Germany)
[hereinafter Roe, A Political Theory]; Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Stmcture in
Germany, Japan and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) (hereinafter Roc, Some Differences];
Symposium: The American Corporation and The Institutional lnvestor: Are There Lessons from
Abroad?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 739.
These art icles should be distinguished from the interesting and informative comparative work
produced by foreign comparativists, which raise different issues. See, e.g., Werne r F. Ebke, In Search
of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance and the Independent Auditor's
Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 663 ( 1984); Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance:
European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 133 8 ( 1984);
Friedrich K. Kubler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57 BROOK.
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law scholars have focused on German bank centered corporate governance
structures, as well as the Japanese bank centered keiretsu structure/ for
alternatives to traditional U.S. forms. What is one to make of this
development? The intuition that one can fruitfully transplant legal rules or
institutions from one system to another is as old as the law itself_3 The
temptation is to try to get something for nothing, or at least at a discount.
In this Article, I want to focus on the specific emergence of the
comparativist tum in American corporate law scholarship, to try to appraise
the significance of the recent American fascination with German and
Japanese corporate governance, and to consider what it tells us about the
possible path dependance of corporate law scholarship. Before turning to
the comparative scholarship, however, I will first try to put it into context
by giving a quick and somewhat idiosyncratic overview of the modem
history of corporate law scholarship in the United States.
I.

THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN AGE: BERLE AND MEANS

Writing in the depths of the Great Depression, Adolf Berte and Gardiner
Means set the course of modem American corporate law scholarship. 4
When one reads their great work, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, 5 the contemporary scholar finds its style and much of its content
as familiar, as comfortable, as any recently published article. While many
of its analyses and prescriptions are dated, it continues to define the field.
In their book, Berle, a law professor, and Means, an economist, set out
to map the separation of ownership and control that they took to define the
modem publicly held corporation. In Book 1, 6 Berle and Means documented in detail the concentration of economic power in the largest corporations, the vas t dispersion of ownership 7 and the mechanisms that managers
used to maintain control over a corporation that they did not own. In Book

L. REV. 97 ( 1991 ); Christian J. Meicr-Schatz, Corporate Governance and Legal Rules: A Transna tion al
Look at Concepts and Problems of In ternal Managemem Control, 13 J. COIU'. L. 431 ( 1988).
2. The term Keiretsu describes the Japanese system of cross-shareholding betwee n related
corporations. See generally Gilson & Roe, supra note I.
3. For a marvelous historical account, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS ( 1974).
4. ADOLPH A. SERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI VATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991 ).
5. !d. My sense is that this is a book more cited rather than read. If true, it is unfortunate both
because of the book's influence on modern sc holars hip as well as its st ill substantial merits as corporate
law sc holarship that bridges economics and legal doctrine.
6. !d. at 3-112.
7. In 1929, the largest shareholders of the largest corporations typically owned less than! %; even
the top 20 shareholders, in aggregate, owned no more than 4%.
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II, 8 they described the declining legal restnctwns on management,
including the weakening of shareholder control over the direction of the
enterprise, 9 the elimination of state supervision over contributions of
capital, 10 the diminution of preemptive rights, 11 and the modifications of
restrictions on dividends. 12 These two sections, which comprise the bulk
of the book, led Berle and Means to claim that "under such conditions
control may be held by the directors or titular managers who can employ
the proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body, even though as
a group they own but a small fraction of the stock outstanding." 13
Berle and Means left an indelible stamp on American corporate law
scholarship in two principal dimensions. First, and probably most
significantly, they implicitly and explicitly defined the central problem for
corporate law to be the separation of ownership and control, and defined
the task of corporate law scholarship to be the correction or, at least,
mitigation of the negative effects of the separation. Berle and Means argued
that the law must protect the shareholders who, because of the separation
of ownership and control, will inevitably be passive . Thus, Berle and
Means gave American corporate law scholarship a practical, reformist style
that persists to this day. As we will see, much of the ensuing sixty years
of scholarship has been a search for the appropriate champion of
shareholders' interests.
Second, Berle and Means' analysis began with economics and turned to
legal and doctrinal issues only after a long empirical analysis. In so doing
they implicitly claimed that economics drives corporate law, with respect
to the issues that corporate law must address (the reformist point), as well
as with respect to the evolution of legal doctrine. The theme of Book II is
that the concentration of economic power and the separation of ownership
from control led, through some unspecified mechanism, to the relaxation
of legal controls over managers. 14 Here, too, Berle and Means' influence
on corporate law scholarship has been so fundamental and deep-seated that
American corporate law academics can hardly conceive of alternative
approaches. Like Berle and Means, almost all corporate law scholars

8. BERLE & MEANS, sup ra note 4, at 119-244.
9. !d. at 128-31.
10. !d. at 131-33.
II. !d. at 133-35 .
12. /d. at 135-36.
13. Jd. at 6 .
14. !d. at 119-244.
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respond to the market and focus on the interaction between law and
economics.
II.

THE

1960s AND 1970s: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS
SHAREHOLDERS' CHAMPION

The normative model of the corporation reflected in most corporate
statutes, as well as in Berle and Means ' work, is that "the business and
affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors." 15 On this model, the shareholders own the corporation
and delegate the operation of the corporation to the directors, who then set
policy and hire managers to execute that policy.
Berle and Means vigorously argued that the reality of the managementdominated corporation was inconsistent with this normative model. In the
management-dominated corporation, managers run the show, choosing
directors and operating free of any shareholder scrutiny.
1
This gap between the normative model and reality animated much of the
corporate law scholarship of the period. Some proposed reforms that would
bring corporate reality into line with the normative model. 16 Three
institutional failings were thought to stand in the way of directors playing
the role anticipated by the statute: constraints of time; constraints of
information; and constraints of composition. 17 To redress directors' time
constraints, a number of scholars proposed the creation of "professional
directors," directors who, by virtue of being full-time, would have the time
to behave as the normative model suggested. 18 Similarly, other scholars
proposed that directors have their own separate staff, in order to give them
the infom1ation and independent expertise necessary to direct the enterprise.19
These proposals-none of which was adopted-faced all of the
predictable criticisms. Once a director becomes a full-time director,
especially if appo inted by the CEO, how does he or she differ from any of
the other members of the management group? Would creating a "shadow
staff," with responsibility for second guessing management but limited

15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
16. For a co llection of articles that illustrate the populist conce rns of scho lars of the 1950s, see
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCI ETY (Edward S. Mason ed., 195 9).
17. For a discussion of these constraints, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSI S 141 -48 (197 6).
18. See id. at 150-52.
19. See id. at 154-56.
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responsibility for the results, cause more harm than good? Would it be
duplicative and interfere with the running of the company?
During this same period, the Securities Exchange Commission began to
study mutual funds, and their distinctive problems. In a series of reports/ 0
close attention was paid to governance problems of investment companies,
culminating in the 1970 amendments to the Investment Company Act. 21
These amendments introduced a number of governance devices to mitigate
the conflict of interest between the fund managers and the shareholders of
the funds. Specifically, the Investment Company Act was amended to
require that at least forty percent of the directors (or trustees) of an
investment company be disinterested.Z 2 In addition, the Act requires that
the advisory contracts between Fund X and Adviser Y be in writing, be
approved by a vote of a majority of outstanding shares, and be approved
by a majority of the disinterested directors of Fund X. 23 Both amendments
were designed to strengthen the board of directors as a counterweight to,
and monitor of, fund managers.
At around the same time, Melvin Eisenberg, in a series of articles written
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, shifted the debate in an important
direction. 24 He argued that the board of the modem, publicly held
corporation cannot direct the operation of the enterprise, and none of the
reform proposals of the 1960s was likely to permit it to do so. In the
modem public corporation, the managers set policy, and no tinkering with

20. See. e.g., SECURITIES EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1 966); SECURITIES EXCH.
COMM ' N, INSTITUTIONA L INV ESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong. , 1st Sess. {1971);
WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUA L FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87 th
Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1962).
21. In vestmen t Company Amendments Act of 1970, PUB. L. No. 91-547,84 Sta t. 1413 (codified
in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 80a). Mutual funds have a distinctive organ izationa l form that
differs from most other corporations. Mutual funds, or, in the terms used in the relevant statutes,
"investment companies," are companies that invest in securities. Investment Company Act § 3(a), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1994). Typically, Fund X will be a corporation organi zed by Investment Adviser
Firm Y which will manage Fund X for a fee that is usually a percentage of assets under management.
Having organized Fund X, Adviser Y enters into a management contract with X, which then se lls shares
of X to the public-sometimes directly, sometimes through brokers. Mutual fund investors arc thus
sharehold ers of Fund X, who depend on the performance of Adviser Y for their returns.
22. Investment Company Act§ IO{a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-IO(a). If an in vestment company has a
regu lar broker or a principal underwriter on its board, a majority of the directors must be independent
of the broker or underwriter. Investment Company Act§ !O(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-IO(b).
23. In vestment Company Act§ 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15.
24. These articles were integrated to form Eisenberg's, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal
Analysis. EISENBERG, supra note 17.
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the directors can change this.
So, argued Eisenberg, one needs to change the normative model to give
the board a job that it can do. The job that Eisenberg carved out for the
board is the now familiar notion that the board should monitor management. 25 He then set out to describe the changes in the structure of
corporate governance necessary to permit the board to monitor management, generalizing from the mutual fund analysis. 26
For directors to monitor managers on behalf of the (passive) shareholders, directors must have sufficient time, information and independence to
do so. Otherwise, the new model would be undermined as the old
normative model had been. Eisenberg thus argued for the establishment of
committees of the board comprised of directors independent of management. Specifically, he proposed that an audit committee should be
established, staffed by independent directors charged with the responsibility
of hiring and firing the outside auditor, determining the appropriate
accounting principles to be used in presenting the corporation's financial
reports, and receiving reports from the auditors of any managerial
malfeasance? 7 In order to prevent the CEO from packing the board with
cronies, or undermining the independence of the board in more subtle ways,
Eisenberg proposed that the committee responsible for nominating new
directors and current directors for re-election should be comprised of
independent directors. Similarly, because compensation of senior management is both critical to providing optimal incentives, and is the area in
which conflicts of interest loom largest, the compensation committee should
be comprised of independent directors. Finally, because the monitoring of
senior management performance and the hiring and firing of senior
management are the single most critical functions of the board, the board
itself should either be exclusively comprised of independent directors or at
least dominated by them.
During this reconceptualization of the board, a number of American
corporate law academics, most prominently Alfred Conard and Detlev
Vagts, focused American attention on the German two-tier board structure
as an institutional alternative and as a suggestive model for reform in the
United States. 28 Two of the proposals to address separation of ownership

25.
26.
27.
28.
in THE

EISENBERG, supra note 17, at 162-68.
!d. at 56-63.
!d. at 205-09.
Alfred F. Conard, Company Laws of the European Communities from an American Viewpoint,
HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 45, 52 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 1973)

I

I
I

I
I

I
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and control discussed in the mid-1960s were the appointment of a fiduciary
to represent the shareholders 29 and the intervention of various financial
intermediaries, particularly pension funds and investment trusts, that would
gradually begin to exercise the powers to which their holdings entitle
them. 30 Professor Vagts noted that
[e]ach of the two approaches just suggested has its rough counterpart in
German law. The German supervisory council represents a deliberate attempt
to furnish the shareholders with a "watchdog" group to represent their
interests, and the bankers' depositary vote is an intermediary that has evolved
so as to concentrate voting power. 31

Professor Conard was similarly taken with the German approach:
The advantages of [the German] system may be more impressive to an
American than to others because it is in the United States that the theory of
management control was first articulated by Adolph Berle and Gardiner
Means, and has been repeated in later studies .. .. Its most obvious advantage
is that it provides a separate group of independent observers to decide how
well the managers are doing. Because they meet separately fro m the
managers whom they supervise, they are likely to be much more independent
than the traditional "outside directors" of American boards, who usually meet
only in the presence, and even under the chairmanship, of the inside
managers. Moreover, this structure frees them from responsibility fo r the
ordinary management decisions which are the proper business of the full-time
executives. 32

In addition to the two-tier board structure, Conard also foc used on other
distinctive legal features of the German approach, including co-determination, the existence of a separate legal regime for closely held companies,
and the system of share certificates in bearer form and the ir transfer. 33

[hereinafter Conrad, Company Laws]; Detlev Vagts, Reforming the '?,Iodern" Corporation: Perspectives
from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 ( 1966). See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Joachim Lieser,
Reform of th e Structure of the American Corporation: The "Two Tier" Board Model , 62 KY. L.J. 91
( 1973). See generally EISENBERG, supra note 17, at 177-85. For later work from th e same perspective,
see Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in
European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459 (1984).
29. See Vagts, supra note 28, at 49 & n.l07.
30. See id. at 49 & n.l 08.
3 1. !d. at 49-50.
32. Conard , Company Laws, supra note 28, at 52.
33. !d. at 54-55, 59-62. 1t is importa nt to note that both Vagts and Conard were acu tely awa re of
the dangers and difticulties of comparative approaches. !d. at 53 ("Even assuming that they work qui te
we ll in West Germany, one may we ll ask whether they wil l be equally effective elsewhe re."). See, e.g. ,
Vagts, supra note 28, at 25 ("To approach Ge rman corporation law with the objec tive of ga ining
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THE 1980s: THE TAKEOVER ERA

Beginning in the 1980s, with the widespread and dramatic emergence of
hostile takeovers in the United States, the focus of corporate law scholarship shifted dramatically away from the Eisenberg approach of focusing on
legal and institutional mechanisms for controlling management discretion.
In its place, scholars looked to the market, and, in particular, to the so
called "market for corporate control" to protect shareholders from
managerial abuse. 34
Corporate control contests, which combined all of the at~ractions of/high
stakes poker and war, became the dominant focus of corporate law
scholarship during the 1980s. While academics disagreed on the details,
they shared a common and fundamental belief that the market for corporate
control was the single most important constraint on corporate management
and that the Jaw should strive to maximize its effectiveness. 35 This
market-based approach continued to dominate academic corporate law

perspective on the American situation means that one must face head-on the two most difficult issues
about any foreign legal institution: (a) How does it work over th ere? (b) How would it work over
here?").
34. The story really begins with an extraord inarily prescient art icl e from 1966 by Henry Manne
ca lled Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. II 0 (1965). In thi s article,
Manne argued that a sign ificant cos t of an antitrust pol icy that restricts horizontal mergers is that
managers will be insulated from the market di sc ipline imposed by the threat of takeove rs. The keystone
of Manne's argument was that com pe titors are the parties most likely to be abl e to recogni ze bad
management, to be able to reverse it, and to have access to suffic ient financing to acquire poorly
managed firms. !d. a 112-13, 11 8-1 9. If thi s is correct- and it certai nl y seems to be- then th e merger
policy pursued by the Department of Justice in the 1960s, which almost en tirely prohibited horizontal
mergers, increased managerial domina nce at the expense of sha reholders.
Beginning in 1980, with the electi on of Rona ld Reagan and, more importantly fo r these purposes,
the appointment of William Baxter as head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, U.S.
policy on horizontal mergers changed nearly 180 degrees. Suddenly, horizontal mergers, even between
large firms with relative ly large market shares, were permi ssi ble. This brough t a large number of eager
and high valuing buyers into the market for corporate control and se t off a decade long merger boom.
In the prototypica l 1980s' "bust up" takeover, an acquirer would pay a large prem ium over preva iling
market price fo r a company. Then th e acquirer wou ld se ll off pieces to buye rs fro m th e same industry,
buyers who had previously been excluded from the marke t.
35 . For representative and prominent exa mples, see the academic debate over whether target
management should be passive in the face of a hostile tender offer or whether th ey should have the
limited power to seek competing bids. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fisc hel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV . L. REV. 1161 (198 1) and
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, A11ctions and S11nk Costs in Tender Oj]"ers, 35 STAN. L. REV.
I (19 82) with Luci an A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers , 95 HARV. L.
REV . I 028 ( 1982) and Ron ald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versw: Pure Passivity in Tender
·
Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 5 ! ( 1982).
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throughout the 1980s and represented a fundamentally different approach
than either the Eisenberg institutional reform program or the managerial ism
of corporate management and the lawyers who typically represented them.
IV.

THE

1990s: THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

Then the music stopped. In the late 1980s, in the wake of the 1987
market crash, the downfall of Drexel Burnham Lambert, the determination
by the U.S. Supreme Court that the anti-takeover statutes passed by many
states were constitutional, 36 and the decision of the Delaware Supreme
Court in the Time Warner case, 37 which was widely interpreted as
permitting target managers to "just say no", the age of hostile tender offers
died. Suddenly, the shareholders' champion of the 1980s-the market for
corporate control-seemed to wither away. Wall Street firms laid off or
reassigned takeover lawyers. Takeover artists shifted their attention (at least
temporarily) to managing the assets they had acquired. Michael Milken
went to jail. And corporate law academics looked for something else to
write about.
Like Rip Van Winkle waking from a fifty-year sleep, corporate law
academics returned to the Berle and Means paradigm, but the world seemed
to have changed. In place of the widely dispersed shareholdings chronicled
by Berle and Means, we found that shareholding had become much more
concentrated. Now, we had a group of very large and increasingly active
institutional investors. 38 Moreover, institutional holdings were (and
continue to be) concentrated in relatively few institutions, at least in
comparison to the Berle and Means corporation .39
Moreover, these institutional investors seemed to have finally found their
voice. Some began high profile campaigns against manage ment-impos ed

36. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Ame ri ca , 48 1 U.S. 69 (1987).
37. Paramou nt Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc ., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. i 99 0). It turned out that
the Time-Warner decision did not protec t target managers to th e ex tent anti cipated. See Paramount
Commun icati ons, Inc. v. QVC Network , Inc., 637 A.2d 34 ( Del. 1994).
38. See generally Edwa rd B. Rock, The Logic and (Un certain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (199 !). Betwee n 1950 and 1989, pension fund s went from
owning less tha n I% of equ iti es to hol d ing in exc ess of 26%. !d. at 447. In stitutional in ves tors as a
group (pension funds, m utua l funds, insurance companies, bank -managed funds and cha ri table and
educational endowments) went from hold ing 8% o f equ ities to more than 45%. !d. Of the top 50 U.S.
corporations ranked by 1989 stock mark et va lue, 45 had instituti onal ownership in excess of 33% and
25 in excess of 50%, and many with even more. !d.
39. The twe nty largest pens ion fund s account for about 26% of the total pens ion fund asse ts. !d.
at 447-48.
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takeover defenses and scored significant victories.40 Institutional investors
+
.
41
also forced out poor1y per.orrmng managers.
Also during the early 1990s, Mark Roe began to revisit the political
history of American corporate law. 42 In an important series of articles,
Roe argued that the fragmentation of American shareholding and the
traditional passivity of American shareholders was not the inevitable result
of economic growth, as argued by Berle and Means, but was largely the
result of a series of political choices. Roe suggested that American
populism combined with interest group politics and the structure of
American federalism may have led to the fragmentation of the ArJerican
banking system (with many states confining banks to a single branch), as
compared to the national banking systems that characterize Germany and
Japan. 43 Likewise, these same forces, Roe argued, may have led to
prohibitions on shareholding by insurance companies for most of the
twentieth century, 44 as well as regulatory limitations on mutual funds .45
Scholars began to write on two different aspects of the same problem.
One group of articles focused on the rise of institutional investors. Within
this group, there was sharp disagreement over the significance of this
change and the extent to which institutional investors were likely to emerge
as shareholders' champions. In the optimists' camp, scholars argued that,
if only we removed the regulatory barriers to institutional investor activism,
the newly energized shareholders would assume their rightful place as
shareholders' champions, acting as effective monitors of management. 46
In making this argument, the optimists, of course, were following in the
footsteps of Berle and Means in taki ng the task of corporate law to be the

40. Rock, supra note 38, at 478 -90.
41. id.
42. Roe, A Political Theory, supra note I; Mark 1. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The
1906 Pacification of th e Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639 (1993) [here inafte r Roe,
Foundations of Corporate Finance]; Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownersh ip and
Control of Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON . 7 (1990); Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in th e
Creation of a Mu tual Fund In dustry, 139 U. PA. L. REV . 1469 ( 199 1) [hereinafter Roe, Political
Elements]. These articles prov id ed the basis for Roe's book, MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS , WEAK
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMER ICAN CORPORATE FI NANCE ( 1994).
43. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note I.
44. See Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finan ce, supra note 42.
45. See Roe, Political Elemen ts, supra note 42 .
46. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REV. 81 1 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520 (1990); Gilson & Kraakman, Reinveming the Owside Director, s upra note I , at 87 1; Joseph
Grund fest, The Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FI N. ECON. 89 ( 1990).
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reformist task of adjusting the law to solve the problem of the separation
of ownership and control.
On the other side of the debate, scholars argued that institutional
investors are unlikely to fulfill their promise .47 The critique has followed
a number of paths. First, there is little evidence that corporate governance
activism increases shareholder returns. Second, to the extent that the rise
of institutional investors helps to solve the collective action problem
identified by Berle and Means, it does so by means of agents who bring
with them all of the agency problems so familiar from the corporate
context. The managers of institutional investors, the money managers, face
conflicts of interest between their duty to maximize the value of their
portfolio, and pressure from corporate management, exerted in a variety of
ways. While managers of public employee pension funds-the most
prominent institutional investor activists-are relatively immune from
pressure from corporate management, they are particularly susceptible to
political pressure. 48 Moreover, the incentives facing institutional money
managers depart sharply from those of their beneficiaries: The agents,
unlike the beneficiaries, benefit from corporate governance activism only
if it provides a selective benefit, not if it leads to a systemic improvement.
Systemic improvements, while increasing the value of the managed
portfolio, also increase the value of the portfolio of competing mon ey
managers as well. The lack of incentives is aggravated by th e fact that
managers of widely diversified fund s compete to be the low-cost provider,
leaving little to invest in monitoring corporate man agers.
Finally, the market and institutional checks on money managers are, in
fact, weaker than those on corporate managers. Takeovers are impossible.
Capital market checks are non-existent because institutional in vestors are
suppliers rather than purchasers of capital. The market for money managers
supplies an uncertain constraint as it is unclear that active monitoring is
valued in that market. Finally, product market checks, while in some cases
significant, vary fro m institutional investor to institutional investor, with
many beneficiaries locked in. Legal checks are not much better insofar as
courts have been even less active in enforcing the duty of loya lty and duty
of care than in the corporate context.

47. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note I; Edward B. Rock, Conrrol!ing the Dark Side of Relational
Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994); Rock , supra note 38 , at 505; Roberta Roma no, Public
Pension Fun d Activism in Corporate Governan ce Reconsidered, 93 CO LUM. L. RE V. 795 ( 1993).
48 . Rock , supra note 38, at 471-72 ; Romano, supra note 47.
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PROFESSOR ROE'S NEW COMPARATIVISM

The domestic debate over institutional investors led some scholars to
look abroad, to discover the role played by institutional investors in other
systems and to analyze the differences in regulatory treatment. Whereas, in
the 1960s and 1970s, American legal scholars, like Professors Vagts and
Conard, looked to German corporate law for alternative legal/institutional I
arrangements-principally, the two-tier board and, to a lesser extent, codetermination-attention was now directed to a very different sort of
comparative analysis, namely, the analysis of alternative economic
governance structures. In particular, U.S. scholars have focused on the
relatively prominent role that large banks play in Germany and Japan, as
compared to the United States. 49
In this context, comparative analyses are important for two reasons. First,
if governance structures are fundamentally different in other highly
industrialized and highly successful market economies, such as Germany
and Japan, then perhaps they could have been different in the United States.
This goes to the question of whether the Berle and Means corporation is an
economic inevitability, as they suggested, or is, in large measure, the
product of a series of political choices, as Roe argues. Second, and more
reformist, if the structures could have been different, perhaps they should
be different. Perhaps America would be better off freeing its shareholders,
especially its large banks, so that they can play a role similar to that played
by large German and Japanese banks.
On the first claim, the comparative evidence is important and persuasive.
As Roe has argued, the fact that governance is organized differently, and
apparently successfully in other large industrialized economies undermines
any claim of inevitability to the Berle and Means corporation. 50 To the
extent that differences in corporate governance correlate with differences
in financial regulation, it lends support to Roe's hypothesis that the politics
of financial intermediation is a key determinant to corporate structure. In
the same context, Roe argues against the claim that Germany and Japan
simply lag behind America's financial evolution, and thus against the
argument that, in time, finance liquifies and disintermediates . While
acknowledging that the boardroom power of the large German and Japanese

49. See. e.g. Roe , Some Differences, supra note I.
50. See id. For perceptive critiques of Roe's article, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Colum bia Cartel
Launches Bid for Japan ese Firms, 102 YALE L.J. 2005 (1993); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note
on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021 (1993).
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banks is under stress from the increased secuntlzation of debt (which
displaces bank lending) and the internationalization of financial markets,
banks' stock ownership and control through the proxy system has remained
constant or increased?
It is the second, reformist claim that is the most interesting and
controversial. In this regard, one should focus again on Mark Roe 's work.
The promise of the German and Japanese systems, to some American eyes,
is that they offer the benefits of close and active supervision, without the
costs of the hostile tender offers of the 1980s. Thus, Professor Roe wrote
in 1991:
Certainly concentrated control by financial institutions is imaginabl e: Japanese
and German corporate ownership is quite concentrated; their financial
institutions are more actively involved in their companies than are financial
institutions in the United States. Daimler-Benz, the automotive concern that
is the largest German industrial company, has a 28% share holder, Deutsche
Bank. When managerial infighting recently left the company without clear
direction, the bank replaced Daimler-Benz' senior manage ment without the
organ izational violence of a hostile takeo ver. 52

Professor Roe does not make the more dramatic clai m that the United
States would be better off freeing its banks so that they could play the kind
of role played by banks in Germany or Japan. The world, Roe recognizes,
is a very complicated place, and the present options depend in significant
measure on history (i .e, development is "path-dependent."). 53 But the more
dramatic suggestion lurks in the background, sometimes more prominently,
sometimes less, and even if Roe does not make the claim, others will. It is
this suggestion that I want to consider. What should one make of these
comparisons?
There are a number of points that one can make. First, the view of
German corporate governance in which the three big banks play an

51. Roe, Some DijJerences, supra note 1, at 1958-62.
52. Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 1, at 15. For a longer, more deta iled, and more cautious
assessment, see Roe, Som e DijJerences, supra note 1, at 1977-95. For sugges tions that insurers could
play a more important role in the U.S., as they do in Germany, ex cept for regulatory restrictions, see
Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance, supra note 42, at 641-42.
Roe, however, is clearly aware that this alternative mon itoring structure may carry signifi cant cost s
of its own. See, e.g.. Roc, A Political Theory , supra note 1, at 61 ("To be sure , (banks] may not take
the stock to monitor, but to force controlled companies to take loa ns or do dea ls."). Roc also advocates
the use of "comparative studies to learn when the close ti es betwee n banks and industry in Japan an d
Germany are beneficial and when they are detrimental." !d. at 62.
53. Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1992 -93.
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important and constructive role as management monitors may be somewhat
unrecognizable to the German corporate law community. When I presented
this paper in Frankfurt, the lawyers and bankers in the audience found it
extraordinary that anyone should think that the system in fact worked this
way. In their view, the large banks played a far less significant and far less
constructive role.54 Along these same lines, the effectiveness of the large
German banks as monitors of management perhaps looked better a few
years ago than today, after the disaster at Metalgesellschaft. 55
Second, and more provocative, what is one to make of the fact that
General Motors' German subsidiary, Opel, is generally considered to be as
well-managed as other German car companies? This is a problem for any
claim that the United States should free its banks, because G.M. is an oftcited example of what is so wrong with American corporate governance.
How is it that Opel, with such a parent (and no hausbank), has been
successful? One response is that Opel fits the model because it has a large
shareholder, G.M. But that response fails because so do Chevrolet,
Oldsmobile and the other poorly performing divisions of G.M . A second
response is that the German car market is an oligopoly, and it is easy for
managers to look good when there are oligopoly profits. However, this
argument, even if true, would prove too much: Daimler-Benz is likewise a
car company. 56 This, of course, leaves standing Roe's deeper and more
fundamental argument against the inevitability of the Berle Means
corporation: The fact that Daimler-Benz and General Motors are organized
differently at the top proves that alternative governance structures are
economically possible.
Third, of course, German fields looked much greener when the United
States was stuck in a recession and Germany seemed to be prospering than
if things had been the other way around. The tone of comparative corporate
scholarship has changed over the last few years as the U.S. economy has

54. But German audi enc es may have a different baseline: While banks may seem to pl ay a small
role in German boa rdrooms, their role may still be substanti~lly greater than their rol e in U.S.
boardrooms.
55. In December 1994, Metallgersellschaft, one of Germany's largest ind ustrial co ng lomerates,
nea rl y co ll apsed after taki ng hu ge losses on derivatives. See Metallgesellschaji: Germany 's Corporate
Whodwznit, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1995 , at 71. Some experts blame Deutsche Bank's prem ature
interven tion for the fiasco. !d.
56. Neither Roe's example of Deutsche Bank ' s relationship with Dai mler-Be nz in Roe, A Political
Th eory, supra note I, at 15 , nor my counterexample of Opel, is, of course , anything more than
anecdotal evidence. As I discuss more below, the success of either could be due to factors oth er than
corpo rate governance structures.

1
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bounced back and Germany and Japan have lagged, and may change with
the business cycle yet again as Germany and Japan pull out of recession.
Fourth, we do not know whether the bank centered structure that has
historically characterized Germany and Japan is primarily driven by
corporate governance concerns. 57 As Mark Roe and Ronald Gilson have
argued, 58 the Japanese keiretsu structure may be as much about establishing an efficient form of industrial organization to support a distinctive
relationship between firms and their suppliers/customers, as it is about
constraining agency costs. 59 Similarly, an alternative hypothesis about
German corporate governance is that the bank's role largely revolves
around preserving and expanding its lending activities, with only secondary
(or tertiary) attention to corporate governance.
Fifth, what evidence supports the implicit premise that German and
Japanese firms are more productive than U.S. firms? The best evidence
seems to indicate that this assertion-sometimes taken to be self-evidently
true in the U.S.-is false or, at least, unsupported.60
Professor Roe explicitly makes a more modest (but still important and
controversial) reformist point that avoids many of these criticisms. Roe
argues that if comparative work shows that different governance structures
are possible between countries, then we should reform domestic law to
permit governance structures to compete within the U.S. system. 6 1 If
different governance structures are possible, and if different structures have
different advantages and disadvantages in different contexts, then why not
let them compete within the U.S. system, and not just in the competition
between the United States and Germany or the United States and Japan? On
this point, I am in complete agreement with Roe: Where possibie,
competition among governance structures within the U.S. system should be
facilitated. Here, Roe's comparative analysis demonstrating the historical
and political contingency of the U.S. structure of corporate governance has
significant payoffs in the domestic debate. There is, however, a further
question, which I will address in more detail below, over the extent to
which competing governance systems are possible within a given corporate

57. Romano, supra note 50, at 2033.
58. See Gilson & Roc, supra note l.
59. !d.
60. For a review of the evidence, see Romano, supra note 50, at 2023-2 6.
61. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note l, at 1989-97. A compari son of Roe, A Political
Theory, supra note l, with Roe, Some Differences, supra note l, suggests that Profes sor Roe may have
tempered hi s reformist impulses in the intervening years.
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law. 62
To the extent that regulations that have outlived their usefulness stand in
the way of the exercise of institutional voice, Roe argues, we should at
least consider removing such blockages. In this approach, the critical
analytical questions become whether particular regulations have, in fact,
outlived their usefulness , the extent to which they stand in the way of an
expanded role for institutional investors, and the transition costs.
Examples of such regulations are the SEC proxy rules restricting
communication among shareholders. 63 Because of the expansive definitions of "proxy" and "solicitation," informal communication among large
shareholders on matters of common concern posed a significant legal
risk. 64 Cautious shareholders would not proceed without first preclearing
all "proxy solicitation" materials with the SEC, an expensive and time
consuming process. 65 In reforming the proxy rules to ease the restrictions
on communications among shareholders, the SEC eliminated (a few)
barriers to the evolution of alternative governance structures without either
mandating the adoption of such structures or exposing shareholders to
significant dangers. 66
VI.

PROFESSOR BUXBAUM'S COMPARATIVE LEGITIMATION THESIS

I now want to tum to a different contemporary approach to comparative
corporate law. If the older comparative approach of Professor Vagts and
Conard67 looked to Germany for potential legal transplants, and if the
newer comparative analyses of Professor Roe and others looked to
Germany and Japan for al ternative economic governance structures,
Professor Richard Buxbaum has taken yet a third approach. Among
American law professors, no one rivals Professor Buxbaum in "his intimate

62. See infra Part Vlll.
63. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-l to 240.i4b-2 (1995).
64. Rule 14a-1 (f) defines a proxy as every "proxy, consent or auth orization within the meaning
o f section 14(a) o f the Act." 17 C.F.R. § 14a-l(f) (1995) . So li citation incl udes " any request for a p roxy,
... (a)ny requ est to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy; ... or .. . [t)h e furni shi ng of a
form of proxy o r other communication to secu rity holders under circum stances reasona b ly calcul ated
to result in the procurement, wi thho lding o r revocat ion of proxy ." 17 C.F.R. § 14a-1(1).
65. See generally BernardS. B lack, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy Reform, 17
J. CORP. L. 49 (1991).
66. See Regul ation of Communications Amon g Shareholders, Exch ange Act Release No . 31,326,
[ 1992 Transfer B inder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 85,05 1 (Oct. 16, 1992) (desc ribing the changes to
rules 14a-1 , 14a-2 a nd 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1, 240.14a-2 & 240.14a-6 (1993)).
67. See supra note 28 and accompany ing text.
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knowledge and perfect understanding of German law." 68 Like others,
Buxbaum found the new prominence of institutional investors an occasion
for a comparative perspective. 69
Buxbaum's comparative corporate law scholarship includes two types of
comparative analysis, one fairly conventional, another less so. 70 In the
conventional part of his analysis, Buxbaum, relying on the German
experience, questions a number of provocative predictions of the future of
the American corporation. In response to Michael Jensen's somewhat
infamous (and, so far at least, inaccurate) prediction of the eclipse of the
publicly held corporation by the LBO association/' Buxbaum draws
important insight on the limits of private corporate structures from
Germany. 72 Similarly, Buxbaum convincingly describes the historical
contingency of the German hausbank stmcture, thereby questioning the
likelihood or possibility of American evolution towards such an approach.73
What distinguishes Buxbaum's comparativism is the less conventional-and more problematic-aspect of his analysis, namely, the way in
which he seems to draw on the critical theory of the Frankfurt School 74
as a source of insight into the comparative legitimating roles of institutional
investors.
The old legitimating ideology- the myth of shareholder supremacy-had to
be abandoned once institutional shareholdership threatened to make it real;
but giving that new ownership a pejorative connotation is at best a defensive
tactic, but hardly a legitimating ideology. That can only be found through
cooperation with these new institutions that, after all, represent all of us in
our capacity as salary and wage earners.
In addition-and not in contradiction-the liberal economic premise on
which this managerialist version of corporatism would function faces a severe
test once ecological imperatives are expected to be operationally satisfied

68. Kubler, supra note I, at 97.
69. Buxbaum, supra note I.
70. Although I will focus large ly Buxbaum's article on institutional in vesto rs, supra note I,
attention should also be paid to Richard Buxbaum, Juridification and Legitimation Problems in
American Enterprise Law, in JURIDIFI CATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE
AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
71. Michael Jensen, Eclipse of the Public C01poration, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61
(arguing that the publicly held corporation is being repl aced by the LBO association).
72. Buxbaum, supra note I, at 26-27.
73. !d. at 34-40.
74. For an examp le of the scholarsh ip of th e leading modem figure of the Frankfurt School, see
JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas A. McCarthy trans., !975).
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within its framework. . . . This, more than concern with the negative
consequences of exposing corporate decision-making to the short-term
mentality of stock and control markets, is what dictates a new respect for a
different, longer term vision of corporate behavior. And this vision, unlike the
adversarial vision of institutional investors as short-term profligates that
underlies the narrow view of short-term versus long-term decision-making
immanent in the liberal economy, needs the cooperation of institutional
ownership with corporate management to be realized. Further, that cooperative venture now has a unique opportunity to be realized. It can find in the
wage-based origin of much of that institutional ownership a unique and
perhaps the only enduring legitimation for embarking on the voyage to
integrate ecological and efficiency concerns in a new statement of corporate
missions and processes. 75

Buxbaum then turns to an analysis of the conditions necessary for the
evolution of a "combined ecologic-economic frame of reference" that will
adequately internalize "the social costs inherent in an appropriately longrange view of production and distribution policies that are sound from
environmental and social perspectives." 76 Only large institutional intermediaries can accomplish this, and they can only do so if they have:
mechanisms to express their values to their portfolio firms more directly than
is feasible by means of voting or acting in the capital and, especially, the
control market (though they need those, too). In the second place, they need
mechanisms to formulate these postulated values within their own boundaries
before transmitting them to those firms, in order to legi timate their own
behavior and decisions. 77

Buxbaum then turns to German legal/doctrinal stmctures not for their
capacity to provide new mechanisms for solving the Berle and Means
problem of separation of ownership and control, but, rather, for their
potential to provide legitimating stmctures in the changing American
context. From this perspective, the two favorites of American
cornparativists--codetermination and the two-tier board stmcture-become
interesting in so far as they provide models through which institutional

75. Buxbaum, supra note I, at 28-29 (citation omitted). For less comparative approach es to the
legi timacy of the American corporation, see JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORAT ION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 ( 1970); Robert Chatov, Th e Role of
Ideology in the American Corporation , in THE CORPORATE DILEM MA: TRADITIONAL VALUES VERSUS
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (D. Votaw & S. Sethi eds., 1973); Gerald Frug, Th e Ideology of
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 ( 1984).
76. Buxbaum, supra note I, at 29.
77. !d. at 30.
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imcstors can legitimate corporate stmctures and in the extent to which
institutional investors can themselves be legitimated through their roles in
such stmctures. The two-tier board, on Buxbaum's analysis, helps provide
a mechanism for systematic input by institutional investors.
Codetermination is important in helping to undermine the traditional
assumption of hostility between labor and capital. Finally, in terms of the
legitimation of the institutional investors themselves and the formulation of
an appropriate ecologic-economic frame of reference, Buxbaum rejects
various forms of pass-through voting, finding "the German experience with
employee intermediaries and with their selection [to] be instmctive." 78
Buxbaum finds that "the elected business agent of the union, in those
sectors which still boast of unions, is the obvious model" of an "intermediate employee institution[] specifically designed to elicit and transmit
employee views . . . to the portfolio-voting intermediaries. " 79 In this
connection, Buxbaum also tentatively supports "fund advisory or managing
boards substantially elected by their beneficiaries. " 80
To the Anglo-American sensibility, Buxbaum's approach is problematic
for two reasons. First, by immersing himself so deeply in German legal
culture, he illustrates another danger faced by comparativists, the problem
of "going native." If some comparative analysis is undermined by an
insufficient understanding of the foreign system, Buxbaum mns the
opposite risk, the risk of becoming incomprehensible to the American
corporate law audience. Concepts like "legitimation," however familiar they
may be in the German context, are foreign to the Berle and Means tradition
of corporate governance scholarship described earlier.
The second problem with Buxbaum's analysis is that it is very difficult
to give the concept of "legitimation" non-trivial content, much less to
employ it. If "legitimation" means something like "to make legitimate in
the eyes of society, " then it immediately raises a host of theoretical and
empirical questions. Do legal or economic stmctures lead to a belief in the
legitimacy of corporations? What is the mec hanism by which legal or
economic structures make an institution legitimate in the eyes of society?
How do you measure how legitimate an institution is? By public opinion
surveys? What is the basis for Buxbaum's assumption that there is a
corporate "legitimation crisis" or his speculation that institutional investors
can "solve" that crisis? This passing critique, of cou rse, does nothing more

78. Buxbaum, supra note I, at 49-50.
79. !d.
80. !d. at 52.
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than recapitulate the debate over the utility of "legitimation" as a sociological construct. 81

VII.

EVALUATION

What, then, are we to make of the comparativism of Professor Roe or
Professor Buxbaum? Return to the observation that Opel, G.M. 's whollyowned German subsidiary, is generally considered to be a reasonably wellmanaged German corporation. If the presence or absence of a hausbank
does not explain the success of Opel, or, by extension, those successful
German firms that have a hausbank, we must look elsewhere for an
explanation. 82
This leads us to a number of fundamental and rather embarrassing holes
at the center of corporate governance scholarship: What is the connection,
if any, between corporate governance structures and corporate performance?
Even if there is a connection, what is the mechanism that links corporate
"law" with corporate performance?
The assumption of sixty years of corporate governance scholarship has
been that such a connection exists. Berle and Means assumed that the
separation of ownership and control and the resulting powerlessness of
shareholders led to worse performance. Eisenberg and the other scholars
who reconceptualized the board as a monitor of management seemed to
have assumed that a company with a board dominated by independent
outside directors would perform better than a company with a management
dominated board. 83 Those heralding the hosti le takeover boom of the
1980s assumed that a competitive market for corporate control led to more
effective management. 84 Those heralding the new prominence of institutional investors in the late 1980s have likewise assumed that companies
with large active shareholders will outperform the Berle and Means

81. For a careful and critical assessment of the utility of the concept of"legitimation" in U.S.legal
scholarship, see Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REv.
379.
82. On this point, Roe and I largely agree. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note I, at 1934-35.
83. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
84. While there is substantial evidence that the takeovers of the 1980s benefited shareholders
through large premiums, we do not know whether these are one shot gains arising from the influx of
new, higher valuing buyers sparked by the relaxation of the restrictions on horizontal mergers, or
whether these represent long term reduction in agency costs. For a review of the evidence on
shareholder gains, see Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9
YALEJ.REG.ll9(!992).
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managerial firm. 85
While each of these claims makes some sense-they could be true-the
supporting evidence does not exist. While there is a great deal of
fragmentary evidence pointing in different directions, we do not have
anything approaching convincing evidence, nor any robust theoretical
models, on any of the most interesting questions. 86 Do outside directors
improve corporate performance? We really do not know.87 What about
concentrated shareholdings? While there is some evidence that firms with
concentrated holdings outperform firms with dispersed holdings, 88 we
know little about the direction of causation: Do institutional investors
improve corporate performance or, rather, do they choose to invest in firms
with superior performance?
Likewise, we do not know how corporate law affects corporate behavior.
Some sort of direct deterrence (or even "hydraulic") modei is implicit in
the standard 1980s argument that the threat of hostile takeovers will induce
managers, even of non-target firms , to manage better: The pressure of
tender offers will push all managers to manage better to keep their jobs.
But a direct deterrence model is implausible, because both the likelihood
of di splacement and the direct costs are relatively small. Moreover, if the
direct deterrence model were correct, one would expect a large decline in
mangerial performance when Delaware amended its corporation law to
permit firms to opt out of directorial liability for breaches of the duty of

85. See, e.g. , Jensen, supra note 71.
86. For a very opti mistic recent survey of the empirical evidence, see Bernard Black, The Value
of Institutional In vestor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 ( 1992). The most
recent work likewise fa il s to find any robust correlation between governance s tructur~s and firm
performance, although progress is bei ng made in teas ing out the more subt le co nnection s. See. e.g.,
Ap ril Klein, Firm Production and Board Committee Structure, (April 1995) (Stem Schoo l of Bus iness
(NYU) Working Pape~. on file with author); James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Lea dership Struct ure:
On the Separation of the Positions of CEO and Chai rman of the Board, (August 23, 1995) (working
paper, on file with author); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies w ith a Sma ll Board
of Directors (July 1995) (Stern School of Bus iness (NYU) Working Paper, on til e with author).
87. For a recent survey of research on the connection between outs ide directo rs and firm
performance, see Sanji Bhagert & Bernard Black, Do independent Directo rs Matter? (Jan. 1996)
(working paper, on file with author). Whet her and how corporate governance affects pe rformance is a
very comp licated issue. One wou ld need to so rt o ut the extent to wh ich governance struc ture affec ts the
decisions made, and , when it does, whether and when the effec ts are positive or negative. A failure, for
example, to detect any systemat ic correlat ion between governa nce structure and performance mi ght be
the result of governance not affecting the dec isions made, or mi ght resu lt fro m gove rnance leading to
better decisions and worse decisions wit h equal frequency.
88. !d.
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care. 89 If the principal sanction is reputational, we know little about how
this sanction works. 90
Thus, it is unclear how we explain why G.M. 's German subsidiary
performs reasonably well despite its American corporate governance
structure and much maligned parent company. The answer puts the whole
debate over corporate governance into an important perspective. The three
best candidates for explaining Opel's (and Daimler Benz's) performance are
likely to be the nature of Europe's automobile markets, the nature of
Germany's managerial labor market, and the social norms internalized by
German managers. As a general matter, product and labor markets and
social norms seem to trump corporate governance structures in determining
success or failure by a wide margin. 91
Consider competitive product markets. Where markets are highiy
competitive, such as California's high-tech industry in Silicon Valley, the
concerns that preoccupy corporate law academics worrying about corporate
governance are non-issues. If managers slack off or steal from the firm or
build inefficient empires, the firm fails in short order and a firm without
such problems takes its place. In other words, highly competitive product
markets root out suboptimal governance structures before corporate law
needs to pay any attention.
This brings us back, in part, to Henry Manne 's point in the article on
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control. 92 Competition policy and
corporate law are intimately linked. On the one hand, a competition policy
that prohibits all horizontal mergers in the interests of maintaining
competitive product markets undermines the market for corporate control
by removing the most likely acquirers. On the other hand, a competition
policy that permits horizontal mergers that create market power undermines
the competitiveness of the product markets that hold managers' feet to the
fi re.
Second, the example of G.M.'s German subsidi ary reminds us that social
norms play an enormously important rol e in the management of corporations, as they do in other areas of our social life. Because it is difficult for
economic theorists to model norms, those of us who fo llow the Berle and
Means economic approach to corporate law tend to ignore them.

89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § I 02b(7) ( 199 1).
90. For an exploration of these issues, see Edward B. Rock, Sa ints a nd Sinners: The Pecu liar
Mec hanisms of Delaware Corporate Law ( 1996) (working pape r, on tile wi th auth or).
91. See Roe, So me Differences, supra note I, at 1994 .
92. Manne, sup ra note 34.
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To the extent that German corporate governance works at the level of
establishing and promoting norms of conduct for German managers and not
on a behaviorist model of stimulus and response-sticks and carrots-the
comparative task becomes incomparably more difficult. Unless German
managers are motivated by the same things that motivate American
managers, there is little reason to believe that the normative structures of
German corporate life have very much to say to America. The
comparativist's problem, of course, is that there is, in fact, little reason to
believe that German managers are motivated by the same things as
American managers. The vast differences in the level of compensation
between the U.S., Germany and Japan suggest just the opposite. 93
Now return to Professor Buxbaum. Perhaps he is asking a fundamentally
different question. The question that has motivated many American
corporate law scholars since Berle and Means, and certainly much recent
scholarship, has been, at heart, the question of how we can make managers
sufficiently accountable so that they will manage the corporation for the
shareholders. For Buxbaum, by contrast, the really interesting question is
why society permits the establishment and persistence of massive private
concentrations of economic and political power over which the political
process exercises relatively little control.
This contrast suggests another level on which comparative corporate law
can be important, beyond the new comparativist's claims that the
contrasting corporate structures of Germany and Japan are evidence that
American structures are not inevitable, are not necessarily a product of
natural economic selection, but are, rather, the product of a complicated
process of social choice-Professor Roe's central thesis. Professor
Buxbaum reminds us that the fact- if indeed it is a fact-that other
corporate law systems take radically different questions to be fundamental
should make us wary of being too confident that the central preoccupations
of American corporate law are inevitable or as fundam ental as we might
initially believe. They, too, may be the historically contingent product of
a complicated process of social choice. That is to say, corporate law
scholarship, like corporate governance itself, may be path dependent.

93. See GRAEF CRYSTAL, !N SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE COMPENSATION OF AMERI CAN EX ECUTIV ES
204-!3 ( !99!) (showin g that German CEOs eam approximately one-quarter of their U.S . co unterpart s).
Differences in compensation are ambiguous. It may be that the differences in compensation policy grow,
in part, out of the di ffe rence in governance st ructures, or that both grow out of differences in managerial
norms and culture.
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CONCLUSION: PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE DIRECTION OF
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARSHIP

The United States, Japan and the countries of Western Europe all have
successful advanced industrial economies. Likewise, all have their own
distinctive histories: of politics, of economics, and of financial regulation.
Examining them today, one finds that the countries have distinctive and
distinguishable systems of corporate law. In Delaware, for example, one
finds a system of t1exible enabling rules. This flexibility is balanced by the
ever present judicial scrutiny that operates under a rubric of fiduciary duty
and employs rather murky standards. In Germany, mandatory rules play a
much greater role with a relatively marginal role for judges. In some
countries, pre-emptive rights are mandatory; in others, they are not. In some
countries, a bidder who acquires more than a certain percentage of the
shares must make a bid for the remainder; in other countries, such is not
the case.
The tremendous variety of approaches to corporate law that one sees in
a comparative survey, combined with an attention to the specific and
distinctive histories of financial regulation, cautions against any straightforward attempt at transplanting. It also pushes comparative law in a
fundamentally different direction.
Suppose that one assumes, because of product market competition, for
example, that each of the advanced industrial economies has a reasonably
adequate body of corporate law. On this assumption, the comparative
project provides an opportunity to try to grapple with two fundamental
questions of corporate law. First, what problems must a corporate law
system, broadly construed, solve in order to be reasonably adequate to an
advanced industrial economy? Second, what is the range of alternative legal
structures that can respond to those problems, and, perhaps more intriguingly, how do these structures cluster?
Roe's argument for allowing different governance structures to compete
within the Untied States is tempting, especially to those of us who consider
the engine for the development of improved governance structures to be
competition: in product markets, labor markets, capital markets and among
states for chartering revenue. One can hardly quarrel with a proposal to
open up the choice of governance forms to new entry from abroad.
Here, the range of possibilities is critical. A striking difference between
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, on one side, and
Germany and France on the other, is the d ifference between a strikingly
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permissive corporate law combined with active judicial review versus a
more restrictive law with less judicial involvement. If, in fact, corporate
governance devices, broadly construed, cluster together in identifiable sets,
then the range of potential choices may be limited. To the extent that
German governance devices-two-tier boards, hausbanks, or whatever else
seems particularly attractive-presuppose a system of mandatory rules and
limited judicial involvement, then the possibility of offering such devices
as an option in the very different U.S. system becomes problematic for two
reasons. First, such forms may have limited appeal when mixed with the
Delaware structure (not itself, of course, a reason not to offer the
possibility). More troubling, to the extent that such governance forms
depend on structural features of the corporate law system, introducing them
into a different structure may have unpredictable negative effects.
Similarly, the notion that the open-textured enabling approach of
Delaware corporate law provides an appropriate model for newly emerging
market economies in the former Eastern Bloc may founder on the lack of
a reliable court system, not to mention the absence of courts with the
sophistication of the Delaware Chancery Court. 94 If judicial scrutiny is, in
fact, an essential complement to an enabling approach to corporate law, an
open question, then one cannot take advantage of its benefits without the
appropriate institutional infrastructure.
We know much about corporate law doctrine in different systems. We
know a fair bit about how corporate law works in practice in ditTerent
countries. We know a fair bit about the hi story of different systems. We
know little, however, about the deep structure, or internal logic of corporate
law. Indeed, we do not even know whether any such structure exists.
Comparative corporate iaw, at its best, provides an opportunity to search
for such an underlying basis.

94. Fo r a discu ssion of corporate law in Ru ss ia, see BernardS. Bl ack & Re ini er Kraak man, A Self
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, I 09 H ARV. L. REV. (forthcom ing !996).

